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Formerly, Air Transport Command, 1942-46, member of Washing-
ton, D. C. firm Douglas, Proctor, MacIntyre and Gates.
L ABOR-MANAGEMENT relations in the United States are today
governed by two statutes, the Railway Labor Act, as amended,'
and the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act) 2
which amended the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) .3
Few realize that common carriers by air are governed by the Rail-
way Labor Act which was extended to cover them and their employees
in 1936. 4 This statute was initially enacted in 1926 and embodied
principles developed over a long period of years within the railroad
industry. During the 20's and 30's it represented the most advanced
and successful example of labor legislation but was predicated upon
the pattern of relationship and stability of organized labor that existed
in the railroad industry.5
The Wagner Act, and its successor the Taft-Hartley Act, have now
emerged as the dominant law of industrial relations. The policies of
the Railway Labor Act are substantially different in many respects
from those of the Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley Act. While it
may be appropriate for different policies to be applied to labor-man-
agement relations in the railroad field than to such relationships gen-
erally, it is appropriate to re-examine the application of the Railway
Labor Act to common carriers by air since its extension to them has
not been a complete success. This has been due not only to problems
created rather than solved by the Railway Labor Act but also to basic
difficulties in the statute itself which have recently become more ap-
parent, particularly when contrasted with the Wagner Act and the
Taft-Hartley Act.
144 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. 151-163, 181-188 (1946), as
amended, Pub. L. No. 914, 81st Cong., Second Session (January 10, 1951).
261 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 141 et seq. (Supp. 1950).
849 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. et seq. (1946).
4 45 U.S.C., 181-188 (1946).
5 See Byrer, "The Railway Labor Act and the National Labor Relations Act,
a comparison," 44 W. Va. L.Q. 1 (1937). This comparison of the two statutes
evidences considerable distrust of the cumulative features of the National Labor
Relations Act and faith in the established procedures of the Railway Labor Act.
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COVERAGE
The Railway Labor Act is exceedingly clear in terms of the railroad
carriers and subsidiaries thereof on which duties and responsibilities
are imposed. The Interstate Commerce Commission is explicitly
vested with authority to determine who are "employees" so far as the
railroads are concerned. 6  Certain companies controlled by the rail-
road carriers are made subject to the Act and those only.7 Such
clarity of coverage does not exist in the case of the airlines.
In extending the Act to the airlines, Section 202 provided that the
rights and duties of the Act should extend to the employees of a com-
mon carrier by air "in the same manner and to the same extent as
though such carriers and their employees were specifically included
within the definition of 'carrier' and 'employee,' respectively, in Sec-
tion 1 thereof."" Such definition of the term "employee" is restricted,
among other things, to one "who performs any work defined as that
of an employee or subordinate official in the orders of the Interstate
Commerce Commission * * *."9 In' addition, Section 201 of the Act
provides that the rights and duties of the original Act are extended to
645 U.S.C. 151, First (1946) provides: "The term 'carrier' includes any
express company, sleeping-car company, carrier by railroad, subject to the Inter-
state Commerce Act, and any company which is directly or indirectly owned or
controlled by or under common control with any carrier by railroad and which
operates any equipment or facilities or performs any service (other than trucking
service) in connection with the transportation, receipt, delivery, elevation, trans-
fer in transit, refrigeration or icing, storage, and handling of property trans-
ported by railroad, and any receiver, trustee, or other individual or body, judicial
or otherwise, when in the possession of the business of any such 'carrier': Pro-
vided, however, That the term 'carrier' shall not include any street, interurban,
or suburban electric* railway, unless such railway is operating as a part of a
general steam-railroad system of transportation, but shall not exclude any part
of the general steam-railroad system of transportation now or hereafter oper-
ated by any other motive power. The Interstate Commerce Commission is
hereby authorized and directed upon request of the Mediation Board or upon
complaint of any party interested to determine after hearing whether any line
operated by electric power falls within the terms of this proviso. The term
'carrier' shall not include any company by reason of its being engaged in the
mining of coal, the supplying of coal to a carrier where delivery is not beyond
the mine tipple, and the operation of equipment or facilities therefor, or in any
of such activities."
7 45 U.S.C. 151, Fifth (1946) provides: "The term 'employee' as used herein
includes every person in the service of a carrier (subject to its continuing author-
ity to supervise and direct the manner of rendition of his service) who performs
any work defined as that of an employee or subordinate official in the orders of
the Interstate Commerce Commission now in effect, and as the same may be
amended or interpreted by orders hereafter entered by th Commission pursuant
to the authority which is hereby conferred upon it to enter orders amending or
interpreting such existing orders: Provided, however, That no occupational
classification made by order of the Interstate Commerce Commission shall be
construed to define the crafts according to which railway employees may be
organized by their voluntary action, nor shall the jurisdiction or powers of such
employee organizations be regarded as in any way limited or defined by the
provisions of this Act or by the orders of the Commission. The term 'employee'
shall not include any individual while such individual is engaged in the physical
operations consisting of the mining of coal, the preparation of coal, the handling
(other than movement by rail with standard railroad locomotives) of coal not
beyond the mine tipple, or the loading of coal at the tipple."
845 U.S.C. 182 (1946).
9 Supra, Note 7.
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"every air pilot or any other person who performs work as an employee
or subordinate official of such carrier or carriers * * *"1o
It can be argued that the Interstate Commerce Commission is
empowered to determine who are the "employees" of the air carriers
subject to the Act. But this would not seem to make practical sense
when the agency primarily concerned with its administration is the
National Mediation Board and the Civil Aeronautics Board is the.
agency designated by law to control airline operations and such eco-
nomic phases thereof as are to be regulated.11 It may be equally
argued that Sections 201 and 202, read together, have the simple effect
of creating an objective standard with respect to which no agency has
any power of administrative determination. Compounding the con-
fusion, the National Mediation Board believes that as a matter of law
it alone has the power to determine who are "employees" for the pur-
poses of the Act.12
It is unfortunate that such ambiguous statutory language exists
for many vital questions depend upon the orderly determination of
those who are "employees" subject to the Act. Nobody knows where
management ends and "employees" begin. The extent to which per-
sonnel employed by an airline are subject to the Railroad and Airline
Wage Board established by the Defense Production Act of 1950, as
amended, is dependent upon the extent to which they are "employees"
subject to the Railway Labor Act."18 The same uncertainty exists in
relation to personnel employed by corporations owned or controlled
by common carriers by air. The literal definitions applicable to rail-
roads in Section 1, first, of the Act would exempt any subsidiaries or
commonly controlled corporations unless, they are engaged in activi-
ties related essentially to the handling of property transported by the
airline.14 It has been held by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit that personnel employed by a common carrier by air to modify
bombers for the Air Forces and therefore not engaged in an activity
directly related to the furnishing of air transportation were subject
to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 notwithstanding the express
exemption provided by such Act in respect to any employees covered
by the Railway Labor Act.15
There is therefore no clear-cut administrative manner in which
10 45 U.S.C. 181 (1946).
1152 Stat. 977 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §401 et seq. (1946).
12 See 14 National Mediation Board Annual Report 8 (1948).
13 See Northwest Airlines. Inc. v. Jackson, 185 F. 2d 74 (8th Cir. 1950)
in which the court held that employees of Northwest Airlines, Inc. employed in a
bomber modification plant during the war were not exempt from the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 which contained an exemption from its provisions as to
employees subject to the Railway Labor Act. The court held that the activi-
ties involved were not such as to bring the particular employees within the Rail-
way Labor Act, even though the employer was an airline and obviously its
employees directly engaged in air transportation were under the Railway Labor
Act and, therefore, exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.
14 See Sec. 105 of the Defense Production Act Amendments of 1951, 50
U.S.C.A. App. §2103.
15 See Note 6 supra.
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"management" or "employer" may be separated from "labor" or
"employees" for purposes of labor-management relations. While,
some employees of air carriers or.their subsidiaries are probably gov-
erned by the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, most are
governed by the Railway Labor Act and others are in a completely
uncertain category. Such ambiguity and division of jurisdiction is
hardly conducive to good labor relations and places management in
the awkward position of adhering to the differing policies of the two
statutes hereafter discussed as well as resolving the question of applica-
bility.
REPRESENTATION AND RECOGNITION
The Railway Labor Act makes it unlawful for an employer not
to recognize representatives of his employees for collective bargaining
purposes. He must make and maintain agreements negotiated with
such representatives acting on behalf of his employees.16 The statute
was, however, adopted at a time when unions were generally recog-
nized in the railroad industry. Consequently, no suitable machinery
was set up for situations where there had previously been no organized
union. The statute did, however, contemplate that there might be
jurisdictional problems as between two competing unions and Section
2, ninth, of the Act made it the duty of the National Mediation Board
to investigate and certify the authorized representatives of a carrier's
employees "if any dispute shall arise among a, carrier's employees as
to who are the representatives * * * "I
Historically, when the Act was extended to the airlines in 1936 only
the pilots were organized into a union.18 As a consequence, the Na-
tional Mediation Board strained to expand its jurisdiction beyond
that of jurisdictional disputes and adopted the concept that when a
group of employees requested recognition there was a dispute "among
a carrier's employees as to who are the representatives." This concept
was based on the assumption that since some employees wished a union
and others presumably did not, a controversy among employees must
be assumed to exist. However, the language of the statute excludes
the employer as a party to the election procedure. Initially at least
the National Mediation Board did not even bother to provide a ballot
that permitted an alternative vote.19 Even today the form of ballot
does not provide a "no union" alternative but only the alternative
heading "Other Organizations or Individuals" the use of which re-
quires a spelling out by the voter of an affirmative choice or his ballot
16 45 U.S.C. 152 First-Ninth (1946).
17 45 U.S.C. 152, Ninth (1946).
18 The Air Lines Pilots Association (ALPA) was formed in 1930 and by
1932 included in its membership three-fourths of the nation's scheduled airline
pilots. Northrup, "Collective Bargaining by Airline Pilots" 61 Q.J. Econ. 533,
534 (1947).
19 See Chicago & So. Airlines, Inc. National Mediation Board Release No.
1827 (June 4, 1947). See also McNulty v. National Mediation Board et al., 18 F.
Supp. 494 (DC, ND New York, 1936), in which the court found that an election
conducted by the National Mediation Board under the discretionary powers con-
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is voided. Once having invoked such a strained construction of the
Act to cover situations not clearly contemplated, the National Media-
tion Board has had to go further and informally adopt collateral poli-
cies in respect to a minimum time within which it will not reopen
any certification made by it and a minimum number of employees,
i.e., a majority, who must have voted before it will certify any union
as the representative of any group of employees.
Such a course of events has highlighted a further rigidity affecting
the determination of bargaining units. Railway labor is organized
along horizontal rather than vertical lines. This was recognized as
the existing method of organization in Section 2, fourth, of the Act,
which gives "the majority of any craft or class of employees" the right
to determine the representatives of the "craft or class."20  As a conse-
quence, the National Mediation Board has found itself in any event
without authority to certify a union as representative of an industrial
unit 2' so that horizontal organization along the lines established in
the railroads has in fact been the sole method of organization within
the airlines. The rigid application of the craft type of union struc-
ture is in sharp contrast to the variety of organization permitted un-
der the Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley Act.22
The Supreme Court has ruled in two cases that there is no judicial
review of the certification by the National Mediation Board as to bar-
gaining representatives designated under Section 2, ninth.2 3  The
employer has been excluded as a party to any such proceedings but
even those who are parties are therefore barred from any right to re-
view whatsoever. The extension of such power, judicially determined
to be final, to matters not initially contemplated to be within such
power is hardly a satisfactory method of administration, however well
motivated the extension of power.
MEDIATORY PROCESS
The Railway Labor Act contemplates what might be called a
series of "cooling-off" phases in the negotiation of agreements. Ini-
ferred on it by subdivision Ninth of Section 2 of the Railway Labor Act was
unfair in that the form of ballot used did not present alternatives appropriate
to the controversy. The court dismissed the complaint seeking a mandatory
injunction to enforce the order of the National Mediation Board recognizing the
particular union because of the unfair ballot. At the same time the court dis-
missed the cross-complaint of the railroad to enjoin such order on the ground
that the employer did not come into court with clean hands.
20 45 U.S.C. 152, Fourth (1946).
21 American Airlines Employees NMB Release No. R 1447 (Oct. 1, 1945).
This decision relies to a great extent on Switchmen's Union v. NMB, 135 F. 2d
785 (1943), rev'd on other grounds, 320 U.S. 297 (1943) which contains an ex-
tended discussion of the precise content of the phrase "craft or class" and dis-
tinguishes it from the broader authority conferred on the National Labor Rela-
tions Board to decide whether the appropriate unit shall be the "employer unit,
craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof." 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C.
§159(b) (1946).
22 Section 9 of Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §159.
28 See Switchmen's Union of North America et al. v. National Mediation
Board et al., 320 U.S. 297 (1943) and General Committee v. Missouri-Kansas-
Texas R.R. Company et al., 320 U.S. 323 (1943).
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tially, the parties must make every effort to reach agreement between
themselves.24 If they are unable to do so, the National Mediation
Board at the request of either party, or on its own motion, shall proffer
its services in an attempt to mediate the controversy.25 It must then
-offer arbitration if agreement is not reached.26 Finally, failing accept-
ance of the offer to arbitrate, the National Mediation Board may re-
quest the appointment of a Presidential Emergency Board.27 To pre-
serve the status quo during this process, certain restraints are provided,
the extent and nature of which are unclear in some respects and, where
clear, somewhat inequitable.
After notice of initiation of negotiations and until ten days after
such conferences have ended or until the National Mediation Board
has determined that its role as mediator has ended, if mediation is
requested or proffered, "rates of pay, rules or working conditions shall
not be altered by the carrier. ' ' 2  But, if mediation is undertaken by
the National Mediation Board and notice is given to the parties that
mediation has failed, then for "thirty days no change shall be made in
the rates of pay, rules or working conditions or established practices
in effect prior to the time the dispute arose. ' 29 The inclusion of the
words "by the carrier" in respect to the initial period may be argued
to justify the conclusion that the union is then free to strike. But
such a line of reasoning should also mean that the union is not free to
strike during the thirty days subsequent to mediation when the words
"by the carrier" are omitted. The history and spirit of the Act would
not seem to support such an impractical version whereby a party is
free to strike when efforts towards settlement are being made but not
free to strike when they are concluded.
One of the purposes of the 30-day truce subsequent to mediation
is to permit the creation of a Presidential Emergency Board which
may be appointed under the Act when mediations have failed and the
President deems it appropriate. It is very clear under the provision
authorizing such boards that so long as such board is in existence and,
in fact, for thirty days after it has made its report to the President, no
strike, lockout or other change in relationship of the parties is anti-
cipated. As to this period, the provision is that "no change excepi-by
agreement shall be made by the parties to the controversy in the con-
ditions out of which the dispute arose. ' '30
There are therefore three different descriptions of the "cooling-off"
that is enjoined for the three different periods of time. Not only does
the changed phraseology raise questions as to who is enjoined but also
what is enjoined. For the first period, it is clearly "rates of pay, rules
2445 U.S.C. 152, First, Fifth (1946).
25 45 U.S.C. 155 First (1946).
26 Ibid.
2745 U.S.C. 152, Fifth (1946).
28 45 U.S.C. 156 (1946).
2945 U.S.C. 155 (1946).
30 45 U.S.C. 160 (1946).
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
or working conditions." For the second period, it is "rates of pay,
rules, working conditions and established practices." Finally for the
last period, it is "the conditions out of which the dispute arose."
It seems difficult indeed to justify the differing descriptions of
scope and applicability as to parties for the three periods of time when
restraints are intended to be imposed since the results are presumably
intended to be identical. Unhappily, the different descriptions have
led to considerable and substantial differences of interpretation.
In one instance, the introduction of a new type airplane into
service while a Presidential Emergency Board was sitting was alleged
by the union to be a violation of the Act since it would constitute a
change "in the conditions out of which the dispute arose." The pre-
vious contract between the union and the company involved had
contemplated the operation of such type airplane and-contained formu-
las for pay and working conditions with respect thereto. The com-
pany's position was that, although such previous contract had by its
terms ended, the relationship that it established for purposes of rates
of pay and working conditions remained binding on both parties so
as to justify the operation of an airplane that had been contemplated
to be operated under the contract even though previously not placed
in service.
Such inconsistency and ambiguity of language not only lead to
very serious practical difficulties, but leave the parties with no effective
or expeditious manner of definite interpretation. It is very likely
that the only party that could resort to the courts to enforce the cool-
ing-off periods would be the government. The Norris-LaGuardia
Act8 ' forbidding injunctions in labor disputes probably prevents both
the employer and the union from resort to courts by way of injunction"
31 Section 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act (29 U.S.C.A. 108) provides as
follows:
"No restraining order or injunctive relief shall be granted to any complain-
ant who has failed to comply with any obligation imposed by law which is
involved in the labor dispute in question, or who has failed to make every
reasonable effort to settle such dispute either by negotiation or with the
aid of any available governmental machinery of mediation or voluntary
arbitration."
and Section 7 of such Act (29 U.S.C.A. 107) provides as a precondition to theissuance of any injunction in a labor dispute the following findings of fact:
"(a) That unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed
unless restrained or have been committed and will be continued unless re-
strained, but no injunction or temporary restraining order shall be issued
on account of any threat or unlawful act excepting against the person orpersons, association, or organization making the threat or committing the
unlawful act or actually authorizing or ratifying the same after actual
knowledge thereof;
"(b) That substantial and irreparable injury to complainant's property
will follow;
"(c) That as to each item of relief granted greater injury will be in-flicted upon defendants by the granting of relief;
"(d) That complainant has no adequate remedy at law; and
"(e) That the public officers charged with the duty to protect complain-
ant's property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection."
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which alone could expeditiously resolve the issues.8 2 The government
would very likely not be a proper party unless it had taken possession
of the airlines as it can do in time of war. 3 The courts are, however,
somewhat sympathetic to avoid this bar to employers and unions as
is indicated by the decision of the Supreme Court in Virginian Railway
v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 1515 (1937) in which an injunc-
tion was granted to a union and the Norris-LaGuardia Act held inappli-
cable on the ground that the provision of the Railway Labor Act sought
to be enforced was amended in 1934 and could not "be rendered
nugatory by the earlier and more general provisions of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act." The same position was taken in Graham v. Brother-
hood of Locomotive Firemen, 338 U.S. 232 (1949) granting an injunc-
tion to prevent discrimination against negro employees, although no
reasons for the inapplicability of the Norris-LaGuardia Act were stated.
In any event, the mediatory process culminating in the recommen-
dations of a Presidential Emergency Board depends upon public opin-
ion to buttress the acceptance by both parties of any such recommenda-
tions. This original intention has been undermined through the
increasing intervention, as a court of appeal, of the executive branch
of the government which first occurred in 1941. In three recent in-
stances, the recommendations of Presidential Emergency Boards in
airline disputes did not bring about settlements of the disputes.3 4
Even the executive branch of the government was unable to secure
agreements between the railroads and the unions in 1943 and 1948
until the government had taken possession of the railroads.3 5 A com-
plete breakdown of the concepts of the Act finally occurred in January,
1951 when a "mysterious sickness" paralyzed the railroad switchmen
after a Presidential Emergency Board had made its recommendations,
the Secretary of the Army had seized the railroads and an apparent
settlement had been made under direct presidential supervision.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
Above all else, it would seem that a law governing labor-manage-
ment relations should create a framework for clear-cut bargaining and
stability of agreement once made. This the Railway Labor Act does
not do.
32 See Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Toledo, Peoria and Western
Railroad, 321 U.S. 50 (1944) in which it was held that an employer who sought
to settle a dispute by negotiations or mediation but refused to submit it to arbi-
tration under the Labor Act is deprived of any right he might otherwise have
to an injunction since in Norris-LaGuardia Act, supra, Footnote 31, it cannot be
construed "to require reasonable effort by only one conciliatory device when
others are'available."
33 10 U.S.C.A. 1361.
a4 See Northrup, supra, note 18 at 558 and 562 concerning the Trans-World
Airlines 1946 pay dispute and the National Airlines strike of 1948. In addition
the recommendations of the Presidential Emergency Board established in 1951
to consider the American Airlines dispute with its pilots were not accepted by the
union. See the even exhaustive summary of the breakdown of the Emergency
Board concept in Frankel's note "Airline Labor Policy, The Stepchild of the
Railway Labor Act," 18 J. Air L. & Com. 461 .(1951).
85 See Footnote (33) supra.
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There is in the first place, a major question under the Act as to
whether an agreement made thereunder can provide, by its terms, for
a fixed date of termination. The Labor Management Relations Act
of 1947 on the other hand expressly authorizes such agreements but
provides for at least a sixty-day notice of termination. 6
It is the custom for airline union agreements to be written for a
fixed term, renewable unless notice of an intended change is given as
required under Section 6 of the Act.37 On the other hand, it is the
custom for railroad union agreements to be by their terms of indefi-
nite duration with the right to serve notices of intended change as
so required by Section 6 of the Act. This latter custom is consistent
with the theory advanced by some that fixed term contracts are of
questionable validity under the Act. The reasoning is that a right,
as well as an obligation, to give notice of intended changes is created
by Section 6 of this Act so as, in effect, to entitle the terms of any
contract to be reopened at any time - and that such right cannot be
waived."8
The difficulty with the theory is that it creates the greater problem
as to when, if ever, an agreement ends. It would presumably end
when superseded by a new agreement, but it equally presumably is
still in effect even after the mediatory process is concluded and the em-
ployer and employees are free to indulge in strikes or lockouts as they
see fit. This leads to the illogical position that both parties are bound
to an agreement as to wages, but, on the other hand, are free to engage
in strikes or lockouts notwithstanding such agreement.
Such a result would neither seem to make good law nor good sense
and quite apart from its illogic would not seem to strengthen the
stability that flows from the binding nature of an agreement so long
as it is in force. Furthermore, it seems equally impractical to consider
fixed term agreements invalid when at the same time as a corollary
their invalidity is based upon a right to renegotiate terms the day after
they have been agreed to and, subject only to the mediatory process,
to be free to engage in a strike or lockout even before the intended
period of agreement has run.
The question is far from an academic one not only because of its
psychological effect upon the stability of relationships but because the
legal rights and obligations of the parties are quite different if a
strike or lockout occurs. If an agreement that has terminated by its
36 The Taft-Hartley Act makes it an unfair labor practice to terminate a
contract unless notice is given sixty days prior to its expiration date. 61 Stat.
136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §158(d) (Supp. 1950).
87 45 U.S.C. 156 (1946).
88 The contention apparently is that the provisions of subdivision First of
Section 2 making it the duty of carriers "to make and maintain agreements con-
cerning rates of pay, rules and working conditions," must be read with the
provisions of Section 6 reciting that carriers and representatives of employees
shall give at least 30 days' written notice of "an intended change in agreements
affecting rates of pay, rules or working conditions." It is then contended that
so read together any agreements made (1) may not waive any rights to reopen
for changes during a fixed period of time, and (2) must, in effect, be contracts
of indefinite duration.
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terms is still in effect through operation of law because of the invaladity
of its termination provision, the employer may not be free to hire
permanent replacements or take other steps available to him when free
from contractual obligations. Similar disabilities can fall upon a
union under the same circumstances.
In the second place, the scope of matters that are obliged to be
negotiated by collective bargaining is indefinite and there is no ad-
ministrative tribunal to which the parties can turn for expert adjudi-
cation of the problem when it arises. It was pointed out in Inland
Steel Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 170 F. 2d 247 (7th Cir.
1948; certiorari denied 336 U.S. 960) that the obligations to bargain
under Section 2, first, of the Railway Labor Act covered "rates of pay,
rules and working conditions," whereas the Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act of 1947 covered "rates of pay, wages, hours of employment
or other conditions of employment."3 9 The court specifically com-
mented that the provisions of the Labor-Management Relations Act
of 1947 were broader and more particularly that the word "wages"
included something more than "rates of pay." There is considerable
reason to believe that the issue of what must be negotiated in good
faith will arise with more frequency as more and more fringe benefits
and like rights are attempted to be negotiated. There would seem
to be very little reason why there should be two separate national
policies in respect to the scope of bargaining, particularly when applied
to companies which may in part be under the judisdiction of each of
the statutes involved.
GRIEVANCES
There is no concept of an "unfair labor practice" under the Rail-
way Labor Act, much less any governmental agency to which as a
matter of right practices or acts leading to labor-management contro-
versies can be submitted for administrative determinations. There is,
however, a distinction attempted to be made between what might be
called major matters of controversy between a carrier and its employees
and minor controversies.
Major controversies are in essence rates of pay, rules and working
conditions, concerning changes in any of which the Act contemplates
voluntary settlement by negotiation and the mediatory processes of the
Act.40 Minor controversies are by implication classified as grievances
or interpretations of the application of agreements concerning rates of
pay, rules or working conditions. 41 As to this latter class of controver-
sies so defined elaborate machinery is provided for settlement through
what is called a National Railroad. Adjustment Board, composed
equally of management and labor, in the case of the railroads, 42 and
39 The National Labor Relations Board has been involved in other aspects
of the same problem. See Aluminum Ore. Co. v. NLRB, 131 F. 2d 485 (4th Cir.
1942); NLRB v. J. H. Allison Co., 165 F. 2d 766 (6th Cir. 1948).
40 45 U.S.C. 155 First (a) (b) (1946).
4145 U.S.C. 152, Sixth (1946).
42 45 U.S.C. 153, First (1946) and see also Garrison, The National Railroad
Adjustment Board: A Unique Adninistrative Agency. 46 YALE L.J. 567 (1937).
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by individual boards, similarly composed and set up jointly by a union
and an airline in the case of the air carriers. 43 The National Media-
tion Board may, but has not, set up a single agency for the airlines
similar to the National Railroad Adjustment Board although it has
the power to do so.44
While the general purpose of this differentiation in controversies
that may arise is clear, there are two very basic defects. In the first
place, the distinction between a "grievance" and the matters contem-
plated to be' negotiated has become more and more obscure. Very
little light has ever been cast on the question of what is a "grievance"
by any tribunals - judicial, administrative or otherwise." It is per-
haps understandable that this should be so. Parties to labor disputes
considering "grievances" desire to dispose of such controversies with-
out injecting highly technical arguments in respect to their nature.
But as industry grows more complicated and unions more sophisti-
cated the issues that are encompassed by "grievance" shift from those
of a personalized nature of little or no precedent to those involving
principles of a far reaching nature. As an example, the right of an
employer to subcontract his work, which is a fundamental right of
management unless curtailed by agreement, can, when exercised,
directly cause a loss of jobs or consequential shifts of assignment which
may, with some equity, be considered "grievances." Again, the con-
cept of "grievance" may be virtually unlimited in the mind of one
person and yet equally sincerely be limited to more minor issues in the
mind of still another person.
Since the Adjustment Boards created under the Act are primarily
composed of laymen there is, rightly from their viewpoint, a disposi-
tion to settle whatever may be placed before them as a "grievance" on
the basis of the particular effect upon the particular persons involved
without regard to precedent or principle. More and more this leads
to an overlapping into the area of matters that should be treated by
negotiation and continually obscures rather than clarifies the concept
of "grievance."
On the other end of the scale there are matters which, while clearly
not matters for negotiation under the Act, may still not be worthy of
being treated as a "grievance." Personal whims and dislikes of others
are good examples. In many instances, it would seem unwise to pro-
vide by law that any matter which in the sole opinion of one individual
was a "grievance" should necessarily and as of right be entitled to be
4345 U.S.C. 184 (1946).
4445 U.S.C. 185 (1q46).
4 See Hughes Tool Company v. National Labor Relations Board, 15 L.R.R.M.
852 (CCA 5th 1945), in which the court distinguished "grievances" from "rates
of pay, wages, hours of employment and other conditions of employment" as to
which collective bargaining was imposed by the National Relations Act. See
also the attempted definition of "grievance" in Texas & P.R. Co. V. Brotherhood
of Railway Trainmen, 60 F. Supp. 263 (W.D. La., 1945) and also the opinion
of Rutledge, J. in East Joliet R.R. Co. v. Burley et al. 325 U.S. 711 (1945) in which
he attempts to differentiate between disputes over "grievances" and disputes
over the formation of collective bargaining agreements or efforts to secure them.
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heard before a formal tribunal and thereby treated as a matter requir-
ing semi-judicial determination.
One effect of the Railway Labor Act is, therefore, to create an
overlap between matters requiring negotiation and on the other hand
matters requiring semi-judicial determination through agencies cre-
ated for that purpose. A collateral effect caused also by the concept
of "grievance" is to place an importance upon some controversies
which may not be deserved.
Furthermore the supposedly binding procedure imposed for the
handling of "grievances" has constitutional limitations. It has been
held by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia that the
decisions of system boards created by the airlines as required by the
Act are not binding if the "grievance" concerns a person not a member
of the union whose representatives together with those of the employer
comprise the system board that heard the "grievance." 46
REMEDIAL FORUM
The greatest weakness of the Railway Labor Act probably is its
failure to provide a forum of an administrative nature for interpre-
tations and enforcement of the obligations imposed on the employers
and employees that are subject to the Act.
Section 2 of the Act establishes certain general duties and rights
for both employers and their employees.4 7 They must both make
every reasonable effort to enter into agreements governing rates of
pay, rules and working conditions. They must not interfere with one
another in the free choice of representatives. They must confer on
reasonable notice when disputes of a major character arise. Employees
are given the right "to organize and bargain collectively through rep-
resentatives of their own choosing."
Certain duties are imposed on the employers alone. They must
not interfere with the right of their employees to reason and bargain.
They must treat with the duly certified representatives of their em-
ployees. These rights and duties are substantially analogous to those
arising under the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947.48
That Act, however, creates the National Labor Relations Board
with exclusive primary jurisdiction to investigate and issue cease and
desist orders for the correction of unfair labor practices and otherwise
to administer and interpret the Act.49 No such forum exists within
the framework of the Railway Labor Act.
46 See Edwards v. Capital Airlines, Inc. et al., 176 F. 2d 755 (D.C., C.A.
1949; cert. denied 338 U.S. 885) in which an appeal was allowed from a decision
of a System Board of Adjustment set up by contract between the union and the
airline employer under a provision that decisions should be "final and binding"
upon the ground that the appellants were non-union employees unrepresented on
such System Board of Adjustment, union members of which had a conflicting and
different interest than that of the non-union employees.
47 See Footnote 16 supra.
48 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 157, 158 (Supp. 1950).
49 These orders may be enforced in the courts of appeal. NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 801 U.S. 1 (1937).
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Enforcement and interpretation of the provisions of the Railway
Labor Act involves a patchwork of possible method and in some in-
stances no method at all. The Supreme Court has taken the position
that the courts alone have jurisdiction to enforce what it calls the
"commands" of the union, not its "policies." The duties on the part
of carriers and representatives of employees to make and maintain
agreements and settle disputes are apparently "policies" only. The
certification by the National Mediation Board of a union as the rep-
resentative of the employees of a particular craft or class is on the
other hand a command. 50 It is also the only matter under the Act in
respect to which the National Mediation Board is given express power
of administrative determination. 51
The distinction between "command" and "policy" is, however,
one whose practical application can for the most part only be resolved
at the risk of criminal penalties or by seeking an equitable remedy
of injunction that may well be barred by the Norris-LaGuardia Act.52
Under the circumstances, there are likely to remain unresolved many
practical questions whose solution by an administrative agency would
ease tensions that are otherwise bound to encumber labor-management
relations. Do the unions have a duty to bargain with the carriers?53
Is a unilateral wage increase during collective bargaining an employer
unfair labor practice?5 4  Such questions as these that have actually
arisen but remained unresolved are only symptomatic of the many
other questions that are inherent in the language of the Act.
50 See General Committee v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co?pany et al.,
320 U.S. 323 (1943) at p. 337, where the Court, after pointing out that certifiea-
tion of a bargaining agent by the National Mediation Board was a "command"
enforceable in the courts whereas the provisions of subdivision First of Section 2
imposing a duty on carriers to make and maintain agreements was a "policy,"
went on to state that:
"In view of the pattern of this legislation and its history the command of
the Act should be explicit and the purpose to afford a judicial remedy plain
before an obligation enforceable in the courts should be implied. Unless
that test is made the assumption must be that Congress fashioned a remedy
available only in other tribunals. There may be as a result many areas
in this field where neither the administrative nor the judicial function can be
utilized. But that is only to be expected where Congress still places such
great reliance on the voluntary process of solution, mediation and arbitra-
tion. * * * Courts should not rush in where Congress has not chosen to
tread."
51 There is, however, some jurisdiction granted under the Railway Labor
Act to the National Mediation Board to interpret collective bargaining agree-
ment. Subdivision Second of Section 5 (45 U.S.C.A. 155) provides as follows:
"In any case in which a controversy arises over the meaning or the appli-
cation of any agreement reached through mediation under the provisions
of this Act, either party to the said agreement, or both, may apply to the
Mediation Board for an interpretation of the meaning or application of
such agreement. The said Board shall upon receipt of such request notify
the parties to the controversy, and after a hearing of both sides give its
interpretation within thirty days."
52 See Footnote 32, supra.
58 Northrup, "Collective Bargaining by Air Line Pilots," 61 Q.J. Econ.
533, 559 (1947).
54 Note, 16 J. Air L. & Com. 113 (1949).
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Section 2, tenth, of the Act, makes a willful violation of most of
the duties prescribed by that section a misdemeanor in the case of
the employer and provides for penalties and fines or imprisonment.
The criminal sanction is not applied to willful violations on the part
of a union or the employees, but it is more than possible for the
employer to be risking criminal action when the ambiguity of the
Act itself may be at stake 5 Further, from the point of view of the
employer, an even more serious risk where bona fide differences of
interpretation arise is contained in the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938,
which provides in Section 401 (1) that "it shall be a condition pre-
cedent to the holding of a certificate of any air carrier that such carrier
shall comply with Title II of the Railway Labor Act, as amended."5 6
The failure to provide administrative machinery for expeditious
interpretation of the Act as well as a forum for its enforcement is,
therefore, paralleled by the existence of prospective penalties com-
pletely disproportionate to the controversies of interpretation that
may arise in good faith. Revocation of a carrier's license would no
doubt effectively penalize the carrier but would also remove the em-
ployees' possibility of employment. Criminal trials to invoke fines
and imprisonment are hardly suitable for either prompt or sensible
determination of matters of interpretation. In short, the cure is
worse than the disease and no doctor has been prescribed to whom the
patients may turn.
CONCLUSION
It is clear that in extending the Railway Labor Act to common
carriers by air, problems have been created for the airlines that do not
exist in the case of railroads. The line between "labor" and "man-
agement" is not only unclear, but there seems to be no method by
which this can be resolved short of protracted and involved litigation.
The framework for recognition and representation in an industry not
yet stabilized as to its function nor unionized in a set pattern is in-
adequate. The ability to achieve periods of stable relationships is
55 Sec. 2, Tenth, of the Railway Labor Act makes a failure or refusal of a
carrier and its officers or agents to comply with the terms of certain provisions
only of that Section to be misdemeanors punishable by a fine of not less than$1,000 nor more than $20,000 or imprisonment for not more than six months, or
both, for each offense and each day during which the offense continues. The
provisions that are so subject to criminal punichment are those with respect to
freedom from coercion by the employer of a selection of representatives of the
employees, right of the employees to organize and bargain collectively, prohibi-
tion against an employer requiring any person seeking employment to agree
not to join a labor organization, the prohibition against the carrier changing
rates of pay rules of working conditions embodied in agreements except as per-
mitted by the Act, and the requirement that each carrier shall by printed notice
notify its employees that all disputes will be handled in accordance with the
requirements of the Act.
5652 Stat. 991 (1938), 49 U.S.C. 481 (1)(4) (1946). See also Kahn, "The
National Airlines Strike," 19 J. AIa L. & COM. 11, (1952), in which he points
out that as a consequence of a complaint filed with the Civil Aeronautics Boardfelt it had a duty to determine whether the carrier had violated the Railway
Labor Act.
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uncertain because of the possible invalidity of agreements binding by
their terms for a fixed period. The attempted differentiation of major
and minor disputes, hinged around the indefinite concept of "griev-
ance" as a minor dispute, leads only to confusion not susceptible to
expert clarification through the informal joint boards imposed upon
the airlines.
Above all else, the lack of a remedial forum for both employees
and employers that can expertly administer the relationships intended
by the Act and both interpret and enforce its provisions is a basic
weakness. The difficult choice of remedies by an aggrieved party, and
indeed the lack of them in many instances, coupled with the existence
of penalties disproportionate to the potential crime of an erroneous
interpretation of ambiguous provisions, is archaic and inequitable to
all concerned. Such a framework would not seem to be conducive to
the development of the most sensible labor-management relations in
a new and growing industry, however satisfactory in the more stabilized
railroad industry.
Clarification of the framework created for the airlines by the Rail-
way Labor Act inevitably raises the question whether it would not be
simpler to place them under the dominant labor law of the land rather
than to continue to treat them as an appendage to the railroads. There
would seem to be little advantage in the split jurisdiction that the air-
lines face. There would seem to be substantial advantage in removing
them from the jurisdiction of the Railway Labor Act. A remedial
forum would be created. Stability of contract would be assured. Scope
of bargaining would be the same as in labor relations generally.
Mediatory processes would still be available as would fact-finding
boards, but in a manner more equitable to all. Organization could
be more flexible and responsive to the growing pains and changes in
the industry through discretionary administrative authority. Other
attendant advantages would accrue in the way of immediate applica-
tion of more modern concepts, such as the union shop and check-off,
which had been prohibited under the Railway Labor Act until speci-
fically permitted by amendment in 1951. 57
In short, the ambiguities and inequities in the application to the
airlines of the Railway Labor Act would for the most part be resolved
by the simple expedient of applying to them the Labor-Management
Relations Act of 1947, which represents the dominant law governing
industrial relations and will more likely always represent and reflect
the more modern concepts applicable to labor-management relations
supported by, experience and public opinion.
57 Public Law No. 914, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan. 10, 1951).
